OneCLI is a new Show HN project aimed at a specific operational problem: many AI agents are still being given raw API keys and broad credentials. The project proposes a different model. Teams store real secrets once in an encrypted vault, give agents placeholder keys, and let a proxy swap the real credentials into outbound requests only after host and path checks pass.

The author says the proxy is written in Rust, the dashboard is built with Next.js, secrets are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM, and the whole system can run as a single Docker deployment with an embedded PGlite/Postgres layer. In practice, the pitch is simple: let agents call tools and APIs as usual, but keep the actual secrets outside the model’s immediate execution context.

Hacker News readers generally agreed that the underlying security problem is real, but the discussion quickly moved beyond the demo. Several commenters pointed out that auth proxies, STS-style temporary credentials, and vault products already solve adjacent problems. Others highlighted harder edges that any serious deployment has to address: frameworks that ignore HTTP_PROXY, AWS request re-signing, and the need to run the trust boundary outside the agent sandbox so the agent cannot simply read the keys from the proxy process.

That debate is the interesting part. OneCLI is less a claim that AI needs brand-new security primitives and more a practical attempt to package known security controls around agent workflows. If agent tooling continues to move from experiments into production, products like this will be judged on policy enforcement, auditability, identity binding, and compatibility rather than on the vault abstraction alone.

It is an early project, but it captures a real shift: agent safety is no longer only about prompt injection or output filtering, it is also about credential boundaries and operational blast radius. Original source: GitHub. Community discussion: Hacker News.

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Show HN: OneCLI Puts an Agent-Safe Vault in Front of API Keys